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The spear to break the security wall of S7CommPlus

CHENG LEI, NSFOCUS

 #BHEU / @BLACKHATEVENTS

OverView

- PLC and Siemens PLC introduction
- S7CommPlus protocol
- Encryption Part Analyze
- Protections

Related Work

- Dillon Beresford. Exploiting Siemens Simatic S7 PLCs. Black Hat 2011 USA.
- Ralf Spenneberg et. al.
PLC-Blaster: A Worm Living Solely in the PLC. Black Hat 2016 USA
- This talk mainly focus on the current encrypted S7CommPlus protocol

What is PLC

Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) is responsible for process control in industrial control system. A PLC contains a Central Processing Unit (CPU), some digital/analog inputs and outputs modules, communication module and some process modules like PID.



Siemens PLCs

S7-300



- S7-200, S7-300, S7-400 using the S7Comm protocol

S7-1200



- S7-1200v3.0 using the early S7CommPlus protocol

S7-1500



- S7-1200v4.0, S7-1500 using the current encrypted S7CommPlus protocol



Replay Attack

- Replay attacks have been widely used in PLC attacks.
- Get the communication sequence packets with the help of Wireshark

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1020	2017-02-24 13:37:26.264282	10.65.96.89	10.65.60.73	TCP	66	5208->102 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=4 SACK_PERM=1
1021	2017-02-24 13:37:26.266384	10.65.60.73	10.65.96.89	TCP	60	102->5208 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460
1022	2017-02-24 13:37:26.266509	10.65.96.89	10.65.60.73	TCP	54	5208->102 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0
1023	2017-02-24 13:37:26.267364	10.65.96.89	10.65.60.73	COTP	89	CR TPDU src-ref: 0x0003 dst-ref: 0x0000
1024	2017-02-24 13:37:26.269514	10.65.60.73	10.65.96.89	COTP	89	CC TPDU src-ref: 0x0001 dst-ref: 0x0003
1026	2017-02-24 13:37:26.276317	10.65.96.89	10.65.60.73	S7COMM-PLUS	289	+5208 PDU-Type: [Connect] Op: [Request] Function: [CreateObject] Se...
1027	2017-02-24 13:37:26.286598	10.65.60.73	10.65.96.89	S7COMM-PLUS	251	+5208 PDU-Type: [Connect] Op: [Response] Function: [CreateObject] S...
1028	2017-02-24 13:37:26.287630	10.65.96.89	10.65.60.73	COTP	61	DT TPDU (0) [COTP fragment, 0 bytes]
1029	2017-02-24 13:37:26.331976	10.65.96.89	10.65.60.73	S7COMM-PLUS	472	+5208 PDU-Type: [Data] Op: [Request] Function: [SetMultiVariables] ...
1039	2017-02-24 13:37:26.360397	10.65.60.73	10.65.96.89	TCP	60	102->5208 [ACK] Seq=233 Ack=696 Win=8192 Len=0
1054	2017-02-24 13:37:26.459946	10.65.60.73	10.65.96.89	S7COMM-PLUS	86	+5208 PDU-Type: [Data] Op: [Response] Function: [SetMultiVariables]...
1056	2017-02-24 13:37:26.460261	10.65.96.89	10.65.60.73	COTP	61	DT TPDU (0) [COTP fragment, 0 bytes]
1072	2017-02-24 13:37:26.556614	10.65.60.73	10.65.96.89	TCP	60	102->5208 [ACK] Seq=265 Ack=703 Win=8192 Len=0
1092	2017-02-24 13:37:26.693001	10.65.96.89	10.65.60.73	S7COMM-PLUS	155	+5208 PDU-Type: [DataFW1_5] Op: [Request] Function: [GetVarSubStrea...
1093	2017-02-24 13:37:26.697851	10.65.60.73	10.65.96.89	S7COMM-PLUS	129	+5208 PDU-Type: [DataFW1_5] Op: [Response] Function: [GetVarSubStre...
1094	2017-02-24 13:37:26.697987	10.65.96.89	10.65.60.73	COTP	61	DT TPDU (0) [COTP fragment, 0 bytes]
1150	2017-02-24 13:37:27.081996	10.65.96.89	10.65.60.73	S7COMM-PLUS	155	+5208 PDU-Type: [DataFW1_5] Op: [Request] Function: [SetVariable] S...
1151	2017-02-24 13:37:27.087581	10.65.60.73	10.65.96.89	S7COMM-PLUS	118	+5208 PDU-Type: [DataFW1_5] Op: [Response] Function: [SetVariable] ...
1152	2017-02-24 13:37:27.087691	10.65.96.89	10.65.60.73	COTP	61	DT TPDU (0) [COTP fragment, 0 bytes]
1153	2017-02-24 13:37:27.157371	10.65.60.73	10.65.96.89	TCP	60	102->5208 [ACK] Seq=1221 Ack=1780 Win=8192 Len=0
1163	2017-02-24 13:37:27.246673	10.65.96.89	10.65.60.73	S7COMM-PLUS	149	+5208 PDU-Type: [DataFW1_5] Op: [Request] Function: [DeleteObject] ...
1165	2017-02-24 13:37:27.251266	10.65.60.73	10.65.96.89	S7COMM-PLUS	121	+5208 PDU-Type: [DataFW1_5] Op: [Response] Function: [DeleteObject]...

S7CommPlus Protocol

- The current S7CommPlus protocol including the S7CommPlus Connection packets and S7CommPlus Function packets has a similar structure.
- 2. First Connection Setup Request

Session ID

Hex	Encryption length	Encryption Part	ASCII
0030	f6 6c b1 a3 00 00 03 00	00 65 02 f0 80 72 03 00	.l..... .e...r..
0040	56 20 68 ad 71 74 34 cb	34 89 19 4d ae 03 0a d2	V h.qt4. 4..M....
0050	e6 f5 7c 5e c3 07 a9 89	a5 5d 31 b0 c2 23 42 80	.. ^..... .]1..#B.
0060	b8 fc 31 00 00 04 f2 00	00 00 0c 00 00 03 8f 34	14
0070	00 00 00 34 01 90 77 00	08 01 00 00 04 e8 89 69i
0080	00 12 00 00 00 00 89 6a	00 13 00 89 6b 00 04 00jk...
0090	00 00 03 00 00 00 00 72	03 00 00r ...

Type:Request SubType:SetVariable

0120	T9 55 59 75 e7 au 31 70	20 40 01 41 00 30 00 22	..TU...f1 &P.U.;
0130	cb 10 c4 f0 42 48 1b f7	bc d5 a7 55 42 0a a0 5c	...BH.. ...UB..\ ..1; 6ES7 214
0140	f7 ff 66 bf 3f 1d 4b 2d	52 b2 1a 87 4b 6e 2c 13	..f.?.K- R...Kn,. 40-0 XB0 ;V4.
0150	4c 85 20 bf 55 9c 2d 7e	c8 01 ce 62 94 44 bd 8a	L. .U.-~ ...b.D...
0160	9d e1 7a 6f 74 e9 95 66	82 00 02 00 17 00 00 01	..zot..f2; 818.A...
0170	3a 82 3b 00 04 83 00 00	00 01 02 00 00 01 00	::;..... <.....=.
0180	04 84 80 c1 00 82 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00>.?.
0190	15 00 82 40 00 15 1a 31	3b 36 45 53 37 20 32 31	...@...1 ;6ES7 21
01a0	34 2d 31 41 47 34 30 2d	30 58 42 30 3b 56 34 2e	4-1AG40- 0XB0;V4.
01b0	30 82 41 00 03 00 03 00	00 00 00 04 e8 89 69 00	0.A..... ..i.
01c0	12 00 00 00 00 89 6a 00	13 00 89 6b 00 04 00 00j.k....
01d0	00 00 00 00 72 02 00 00	r...

Second Connection Encryption

Frame Boundary

S7CommPlus Protocol

- Session ID :

Session ID = Object ID+0x80

Object ID
80 72 01 00
02 **87 0f** 87

Session ID
0 00 03 00 01 a2 02 f0 80 72 0
5 42 00 00 00 02 00 00 **03 8f** 3
2 8- 20 02 22 01 00 17 00 00 0

S7CommPlus Protocol

- Encryption Part :

1. The second connection packet has two encryptions

d6 8b 1b e1	First Connection Encryption	3e 67 2f 45n.H. ..a.>g/E
f9 53 59 75		08 3b bb 22	.SYu...?{ &F.O.;."
cb 10 c4 f0 42 48 1b f7		bc d5 a7 55 42 0a a0 5cBH.. ...UB..\
f7 ff 66 bf 3f 1d 4b 2d		52 b2 1a 87 4b 6e 2c 13	..f.? .K- R...Kn,.
4c 85 20 bf 55 9c 2d 7e		c8 01 ce 62 94 44 bd 8a	L. .U.-~ ...b.D..
9d e1 7a 6f 74 e9 95 66		82 00 02 00 17 00 00 01	..zot..f
3a 82 3b 00 04 83			.;..... <.....=.
04 84 80 c1 00 82	Second Connection Encryption	>

2. The function packet has one encryption (Integrity Part)

	Encryption length	Encryption Part	
030	f6 6c b1 a3 00 00 03 00	00 65 02 f0 80 72 03 00	.l..... .e...r..
040	56 20 68 ad 71 74 34 cb	34 89 19 4d ae 03 0a d2	V h.qt4. 4..M....
050	e6 f5 7c 5e c3 07 a9 89	a5 5d 31 b0 c2 23 42 80	.. ^..... .]1..#B.
060	b8 fc 31 00 00 04 f2 00	00 00 0c 00 00 03 8f 34	1
070	00 00 00 34 01 00 77 00	08 01 00 00 01 08 80 60	Session ID ;



The Encryption

(2) Second encryption in the connection packet

Using the result of the first encryption as input parameter, the second encryption is calculated through a more complex Siemens-private algorithm.



```

0030 fa 08 b2 e0 00 00 03 00 01 a2 02
0040 93 31 00 00 05 42 00 00 00 02 00
0050 00 03 d3 02 02 8e 26 82 32 01 00
0060 8e 09 00 04 00 8e 0a 00 07 00 8f
0070 07 21 8e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0080 23 00 04 00 024:x86> dd 1913703c
0090 00 00 07 1913703c ff25f6e4 fe88166b ff
00a0 ec 8e 23 1913704c 00000000 00000000 00000000
00b0 00 14 00 1913705c 00000000 00000000 00000000
00c0 00 01 00 1913706c 00000000 00000000 00000000
00d0 00 00 00 1913707c 80000000 006f000f 00000000
00e0 00 00 00 1913708c 00610063 0069007a 00000000
00f0 bf fa d9 00 01 00 1913709c 00540020 00610072 00000000
0100 60 55 35 00 00 00 191370ac 006f0069 0065006e 00000000
0110 d6 8b 1b e5 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0120 f9 53 59 75 e/ ad 3f /b zb 4b 8f
0130 cb e4 f6 25 ff 6b 16 88 fe 70 d4
0140 f5 ff 66 bf 3f 1d 4b 2d 52 b2 1a
  
```

First Encryption Part

```

v16 = (*( _BYTE *) (a1 + 595) << 24) | (*( _BYTE *) (a1 + 594) << 16) | (*( _BYTE *) (a1 + 593) << 8) | *( _BYTE *) (a1 + 592);
sub_101DA9A0((int)&v16, &u, a4);
u9 = 16;
*( _BYTE *) a1 = 1;
if ( *( _DWORD *) (a1 + 0x240) )
{
sub_101DAA30(a1 + 0x22C,
sub_101DA9A0((int)&v16, &u, a4);
for ( i = 0; i < *( _DWORD *) (a1 + 0x22C); i++)
{
v15[i] ^= *( _BYTE *) (i + 0x22C);
*a2++ = v15[i];
}
for ( i = *( _DWORD *) (a1 + 0x22C); i < *( _DWORD *) (a1 + 0x240); i++)
v15[i] = 0;
sub_101DA920((int)v15, &u, a4);
*( _DWORD *) (a1 + 0x21C) ^= v16;
*( _DWORD *) (a1 + 0x220) ^= v16;
*( _DWORD *) (a1 + 0x224) ^= v16;
*( _DWORD *) (a1 + 0x228) ^= v16;
ValueChange(a1 + 0x21C, a1 + 0x220);
u9 += *( _DWORD *) (a1 + 57);
}
*( _DWORD *) (a1 + 0x228) ^= v16;
ValueChange(a1 + 0x21C, a1 + 0x220);
sub_101DAA30(a1 + 0x21C, (int)v16, &u, a4);
if ( a4 )
  
```

```

0140 f5 ff 66 bf 3f 1d 4b 2d 52 b2 1a 87 4b 6e 2c 13
0150 4c 85 20 bf 55 9c 2d 7e c8 bd 85 36 f3 f5 a9 bc
0160 78 8d 94 24 c7 d2 c3 8b 1d 00 02 00 17 00 00 01
0170 3a 82 3b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0180 04 84 80 c1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0190 15 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
01a0 34 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
01b0 30 182cd615 83c40c 00 024:x86> dd 3e14e550
01c0 1 3e14e550 f33685bd 78bca9f5 c724948d 1d8bc3d2
01d0 00 3e14e560 00000010 55b12085 c87e2d9c 00000000
3e14e570 00000000 63a70f70 3e14e590 182c79c8
3e14e580 3e14e5b0 19137064 3e14f814 00000000
3e14e590 3e14f818 182c73c0 3e14e5b0 1913705c
3e14e5a0 3e14f814 00000000 00000000 00000000
3e14e5b0 00000001 9d9a5ef8 f3e19f57 3ca5c89e
3e14e5c0 17df3b51 00000004 1eb3fd9a 01cfdc35
  
```

Second Encryption Part

```

..f.?.K- R...Kn,.
L. .U.-~ ...6....
x..$. ....
:;..... <.....=.
.....>. ....?.
  
```


Second Encryption Calculated using Windbg



The Encryption

2. Function packet encryption

A fixed field array with Session ID is the input parameter. A complex algorithm (we call this Encryption3) is used to calculate the encryption result as follows:



```

Disassembly
Offset: @$scope:ip
171b93a9 5d      pop     ebp
171b93aa c3      ret
171b93ab cc      int     3
171b93ac cc      int     3
171b93ad cc      int     3
171b93ae cc      int     3
171b93af cc      int     3
171b93b0 55      push   ebp
171b93b1 8bc     mov     ebp, esp
171b93b3 83ec24 sub     esp, 24h
171b93b6 a150f25d17 mov    eax, dword ptr [OMSp_core_managed+0x1d93b0]
171b93bb 33c5   xor     eax, ebp
171b93bd 8945fc mov    dword ptr [ebp-4], eax
171b93c0 8b450c mov    eax, dword ptr [ebp+0Ch]
171b93c3 50     push   eax
171b93c4 8d4ddc lea    ecx, [ebp-24h]
171b93c7 51     push   ecx
171b93c9 e8e3fcffff call   OMSp_core_managed+0x1d93b0 (171b93b0)
171b93cd 83c408 add     esp, 8
171b93d0 8b550c mov    edx, dword ptr [ebp+0Ch]
171b93d3 83c268 add     edx, 68h
171b93d6 52     push   edx
171b93d7 6a20   push   20h
171b93d9 8d45dc lea    eax, [ebp-24h]
171b93dc 50     push   eax
171b93dd e89ef9ffff call   OMSp_core_managed+0x1d93b0 (171b93b0)
171b93e2 83c40c add     esp, 0Ch
171b93e5 8b4d0c mov    ecx, dword ptr [ebp+0Ch]
171b93e8 83c168 add     ecx, 68h
171b93eb 51     push   ecx
171b93ec 8b5508 mov    edx, dword ptr [ebp+8]
171b93ef 52     push   edx
  
```


```

IDA View-C
Pseudocode-A
1 int __cdecl sub_101D93B0(int a1, int a2)
2 {
3     char v3; // [sp+0h] [bp-24h]@1
4
5     IntegrityPartEncrypt((int)&v3, a2);
6     sub_101D8D80((int)&v3, 0x20u, a2 + 1);
7     IntegrityPartEncrypt(a1, a2 + 0x68);
8     return 0;
9 }
  
```

```


Frame 564: 155 bytes on wire (1240 bits), 155 bytes captured (1240 bits)
Ethernet II, Src: Dell_8d:b4:b9 (64:00:6a:8d:b4:b9), Dst: Siemens_97:ec:7c (28:63:36:97:ec:7c)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.65.96.89, Dst: 10.65.60.73
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 28242, Dst Port: 102, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 101
TPKT, Version: 3, Length: 101
ISO 8073/X.224 COTP Co: OMSp_core_managed+0x1d93f0: call OMSp_core_managed+0x1d90b0 (171b90b0)
S7 Communication Plus 0:031:x86> p
Header PDU-Type: Data OMSp_core_managed+0x1d93f5:
Integrity part 171b93f5 83c408 add esp, 8
Digest Length: 32:0:031:x86> dd 1803d8d0
Packet Digest: ad1803d8d0 ad5e9f04 a86d20a2 c08c1bf1 9d9cffb5
2ec59764 6e0279af 73d2de6c f2a8d796
Data Op: Request (d803d900 00000300 b6501300 6f909f9d 02bb04ed
Opcode: Request (d803d900 6c1b7549 304c8e6e 959d08e9 6684d41f
Reserved: 0x0000 1803d910 2316deff 00008088 00000000 00000000
Function: GetVarS1 1803d920 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
Reserved: 0x0000 1803d930 03000000 00000000 749fb3b8 80000000
Sequence number: 3
0000 28 63 36 97 ec 7c 64 00 6a 8d b4 b9 08 00 45 00 (c6..[d. j.....E.
0010 00 8d 14 ab 40 00 80 06 00 00 0a 41 60 59 0a 41 ...@... ..A.Y.A
0020 3c 49 6e 52 00 66 8f 5a 61 b5 00 0b 70 6d 50 18 <InR.f.z a...pmP.
0030 f9 e8 b1 a3 00 00 03 00 00 65 02 f0 80 72 03 00 .....e...r...
0040 56 20 ad 5e 9f 04 a8 6d 20 a2 c0 8c 1b f1 9d 9c V |...m .....
0050 ff b5 2e c5 97 64 6e 02 79 af 73 d2 de 6c f2 a8 .....dn. v.s.l...
0060 d7 9c 31 00 00 05 86 00 00 03 00 00 03 bb 34 |.....4
0070 00 00 02 5c 20 04 01 a4 67 00 00 04 e8 89 69 00 .....g...i.
0080 12 00 00 00 00 89 6a 00 13 00 89 6b 00 04 00 00 .....j...k....
  
```

Demonstration



The Encryption

3. S7CommPlus Communication with Encryption



Protections

Code level:

- Use code confusion techniques and anti-Debug techniques for the key DLL files

Design level

- use a private key as an input parameter for encryption algorithm in the communication between Siemens software and PLCs.

Protocol level

- Encrypt the whole packets instead of the key byte encryption

Thank You!

chengleim19@gmail.com